-
作者：Al-Najjar, Nabil, I; Pomatto, Luciano
作者单位：Northwestern University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：In the evaluation of public policies, a crucial distinction is between plans that involve purely idiosyncratic risk and those that generate correlated, or aggregate, risk. While natural, this distinction is not captured by standard utilitarian aggregators. In this paper we revisit Harsanyi's (1955) celebrated theory of preferences aggregation and develop a parsimonious generalization of utilitarianism. The theory we propose captures sensitivity to aggregate risk in large populations and can be...
-
作者：Flemming, Jean
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：An evolving outside option is introduced into a stochastic directed search model with skill loss during non-employment. Using multi-spell data from the SIPP, I show that average reemployment wages are only mildly sensitive to unemployment duration while the job finding probability is highly sensitive to duration, with evidence of true duration dependence in both variables. Though untargeted, the model produces a quantitatively accurate decline in the job finding probability and starting wage, ...
-
作者：Dewan, Ambuj; Neligh, Nathaniel
作者单位：New York University; Chapman University System; Chapman University
摘要：Models of costly information acquisition have grown in popularity in economics. However, little is known about what form information costs take in reality. We show that under mild assumptions on costs, including continuity and convexity, gross payoffs to decision makers are non-decreasing and continuous in potential rewards. We conduct experiments involving simple perceptual tasks with fine-grained variation in the level of potential rewards. Most subjects exhibit monotonicity in performance w...
-
作者：Rong, Kang; Tang, Qianfeng; Zhang, Yongchao
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：For school choice (priority-based allocation) problems, when the priority structure is acyclic, the associated student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is Pareto efficient and group strategy-proof (Ergin, 2002). We reveal a hidden iterative removal structure behind such deferred acceptance algorithms. A nonempty set of students is called a top fair set(TFS) if when all students apply to their most preferred schools and all schools accept the best applicants up to their quotas, students ...
-
作者：Evans, George W.; McGough, Bruce
作者单位：University of Oregon; University of St Andrews
摘要：We introduce a new class of solutions to nonlinear forward-looking models called near-rational sunspot equilibria (NRSE). NRSE are natural nonlinear extensions of the usual sunspot equilibria associated with the linearized version of the economy, and are near-rational in that agents use the optimal linear forecasting model when forming expectations. Generic results for existence and stability under learning are established. NRSE in indeterminate nonlinear models are found to be stable under le...
-
作者：de Meza, David; Reito, Francesco
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Catania
摘要：There are good reasons why sellers often post prices before the realization of demand shocks. We study whether equilibrium prices chosen ex ante coincide with the ex-ante prices that maximize expected aggregate surplus. The main result is that even in the competitive limit there is a divergence. Waste is excessive and entry decisions are distorted. The problem is that for competitive firms to sell in low-demand states involves a costly sacrifice of high-state revenue. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. Al...
-
作者：Kane, Robert F.; Peretto, Pietro F.
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：We model distribution, the delivery of goods to customers, as an activity governed by its own technology and undertaken by firms subsequently to production. We then use the model to investigate how distribution shapes innovation-driven economic growth. We contrast two canonical specifications of distribution costs, iceberg vs. per-unit. The per-unit cost implies that factory-specific productivity improvements cannot sustain steady-state growth. Quality improvement, instead, raises the services...
-
作者：Bloch, Francis; Dutta, Bhaskar; Dziubinski, Marcin
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Paris School of Economics; University of Warwick; University of Warsaw
摘要：We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We characterize optimal networks for the hider, as well as equilibrium hiding and seeking strategies on these networks. We show that optimal networks are either equivalent to cycles or variants of core-periphery networks where every node in the periphery is connected to a single node in the core. (C)...
-
作者：Martin, Simon; Schlag, Karl H.
作者单位：Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; University of Vienna
摘要：When should one pay the ferryman? When to pay for the delivery of a good, and how should one invest in a public good if there is a single transaction and institutions are costly? We show how to solve the hold-up problem. The idea is to appropriately split up the desired total contribution into several separate contributions that are made in sequence, with each party threatening to discontinue if others deviate. Our solution concept is based on subgame perfection, where players are either selfi...
-
作者：Sun, Xiang; Sun, Yeneng; Yu, Haomiao
作者单位：Wuhan University; Wuhan University; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; Toronto Metropolitan University
摘要：This paper proposes a solution concept called the type-symmetric randomized equilibrium (TSRE), where agents with the same type of characteristics take the same randomized choice. It is shown that this solution concept provides a micro-foundation for the macro notion of equilibrium distribution for economies and games with many agents. In particular, any Walrasian (resp. Nash) equilibrium distribution in a large economy (resp. game) is shown to be uniquely determined by one TSRE if the agent s...
