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作者：Bierbrauer, Felix; Winkelmann, Justus
作者单位：University of Cologne; University of Bonn
摘要：We study public goods provision subject to ex post incentive and participation constraints. We also impose a requirement of anonymity. Different public goods can be bundled if sufficient resources are available. The analysis focuses on the all-or-nothing-mechanism: Expand provision as much as is resource feasible if no one vetoes - otherwise stick to the status quo. We show that the probability of the all-outcome converges to one as the capacity becomes unbounded. For a given finite capacity, ...
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作者：Ushchev, Philip; Zenou, Yves
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Monash University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Although the linear-in-means model is the workhorse model in empirical work on peer effects, its theoretical properties are understudied. In this study, we develop a social-norm model that provides a micro-foundation of the linear-in-means model and investigate its properties. We show that individual outcomes may increase, decrease, or vary non-monotonically with the taste for conformity. Equilibria are usually inefficient and, to restore the first best, the planner needs to subsidize (tax) ag...
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作者：Casajus, Andre; Kramm, Michael; Wiese, Harald
作者单位：HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management; Dortmund University of Technology; Leipzig University
摘要：We derive population dynamics from finite cooperative games with transferable utility, where the players are interpreted as types of individuals. We show that any asymptotically stable population profile is characterized by a coalition: while the types in the coalition have the same positive share, the other types vanish. The average productivity of such a stable coalition must be greater than the average productivity of any proper sub- or supercoalition. In simple monotonic games, this means ...
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作者：Troyan, Peter; Morrill, Thayer
作者单位：University of Virginia; North Carolina State University
摘要：A mechanism is strategy-proof if agents can never profitably manipulate it, in any state of the world; however, not all non-strategy-proof mechanisms are equally easy to manipulate - some are more obviously manipulable than others. We propose a formal definition of an obvious manipulation in which agents compare worst cases to worst cases and best cases to best cases. We show that a profitable manipulation is obvious if and only if it can be identified as profitable by a cognitively limited ag...
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作者：Joshi, Sumit; Mahmud, Ahmed Saber; Sarangi, Sudipta
作者单位：George Washington University; Johns Hopkins University; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; George Washington University; Johns Hopkins University; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：This paper examines the formation of one network G when connections in a second network H are inherited under two scenarios: (i) H is asymmetric allowing for a wide range of networks called nested split graphs, and (ii) H is a connected regular graph. The bulk of our paper assumes that both G and H are interdependent because the respective actions in each are (weak) strategic complements. This complementarity creates a silver spoon effect whereby those who inherit high Katz-Bonacich centrality...
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作者：Chander, Parkash; Wooders, Myrna
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Vanderbilt University
摘要：We propose a new solution concept for games in extensive form that incorporates both cooperation and subgame perfection. From its definition and properties, the new solution concept, named the subgame-perfect core, is a refinement of the core of an extensive game in the same sense as the set of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria is a refinement of the set of Nash equilibria. To further characterize the subgame-perfect core, we show that each subgame-perfect core payoff vector can be implemented a...
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作者：Kohlhas, Alexandre N.
摘要：The past two decades have seen a considerable increase in the amount of public information provided by policymakers. Are such disclosures desirable? Or is it instead preferable to use such information to condition a policy instrument, such a tax or an interest rate? This paper studies the relative merits of each means to use a policymaker's information in a flexible class of economies that feature dispersed information, and payoff and learning externalities. I provide conditions for when the e...
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作者：Loertscher, Simon; Marx, Leslie M.
作者单位：University of Melbourne; Duke University
摘要：Clock auctions have a number of properties that make them attractive for practical purposes. They are weakly group strategy-proof, make bidding truthfully an obviously dominant strategy, and preserve trading agents' privacy. However, optimal reserve prices and stopping rules depend on the details of underlying distributions, and so clock auctions have proved challenging to implement in a prior-free, asymptotically optimal way. In this paper, we develop a prior-free clock auction that is asympt...
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作者：Ma, Qingyin; Stachurski, John; Toda, Alexis Akira
作者单位：Capital University of Economics & Business; Australian National University; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We analyze the household savings problem in a general setting where returns on assets, non-financial income and impatience are all state dependent and fluctuate over time. All three processes can be serially correlated and mutually dependent. Rewards can be bounded or unbounded, and wealth can be arbitrarily large. Extending classic results from an earlier literature, we determine conditions under which (a) solutions exist, are unique and are globally computable, (b) the resulting wealth dynam...
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作者：Huang, Shiyang; Qiu, Zhigang; Yang, Liyan
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; Renmin University of China; Renmin University of China; University of Toronto; Johns Hopkins University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai Institute of International Finance & Economics
摘要：We study the effects of institutionalization on fund manager compensation and asset prices. Institutionalization raises the performance-sensitive component of the equilibrium contract, which makes institutional investors effectively more risk averse. Institutionalization affects market outcomes through two opposing effects. The direct effect is to bring in more informed capital, and the indirect effect is to make each institutional investor trade less aggressively on information through affect...
