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作者：Terstiege, Stefan; Wasser, Cedric
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Basel
摘要：Motivated by the regulation of product information, we study buyer-optimal information structures under monopoly pricing. The information structure determines the buyer's private learning of his valuation and in consequence the price the seller charges. By adding information, the seller may change the learning in her favor. We introduce the constraint that the information structure be extensionproof: the seller must have no incentive to add information. A two-parameter class of information str...
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作者：Bizzotto, Jacopo; Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien
作者单位：Oslo Metropolitan University (OsloMet); Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：Certifiers often base their decisions on a mixture of information, some of which is voluntarily disclosed by applicants, and some of which they acquire by way of tests or otherwise. We study the interplay between the information acquisition of certifiers and the information disclosure of applicants. We show that the inability of a certifier to commit to the amount of information to be acquired can result in a reduction of information disclosed. Among other consequences, given the choice betwee...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Liu, Ce; Rehbeck, John
作者单位：Georgetown University; Michigan State University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We provide revealed preference characterizations for choices made under various forms of costly information acquisition. We examine nonseparable, multiplicative, and constrained costly information acquisition. In particular, this allows the possibility of unknown time delay for acquiring information. The techniques we use parallel the duality properties in the standard consumer problem. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Vartiainen, Hannu
作者单位：University of Turku; University of Glasgow; University of Helsinki
摘要：In this paper, we re-examine the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting where coalitions are fundamental behavioral units, and the outcomes of their interactions are predicted by applying the solution concept of the core. The planner's exercise includes designing a code of rights that specifies the collection of coalitions having the right to block one outcome by moving to another. A code of individual rights is a code of rights in which only unit ...
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作者：Drugov, Mikhail; Ryvkin, Dmitry
作者单位：New Economic School; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：Heavy-tailed fluctuations are common in many environments, such as sales of creative and innovative products or the financial sector. We study how the presence of heavy tails in the distribution of shocks affects the optimal allocation of prizes in rank-order tournaments a la Lazear and Rosen (1981). While a winner take-all prize schedule maximizes aggregate effort for light-tailed shocks, prize sharing becomes optimal when shocks acquire heavy tails, increasingly so following a skewness order...
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作者：Leslie, David S.; Perkins, Steven; Xu, Zibo
作者单位：Lancaster University; Singapore University of Technology & Design
摘要：We define and analyse three learning dynamics for two-player zero-sum discounted-payoff stochastic games. A continuous-time best-response dynamic in mixed strategies is proved to converge to the set of Nash equilibrium stationary strategies. Extending this, we introduce a fictitious-play-like process in a continuous-time embedding of a stochastic zero-sum game, which is again shown to converge to the set of Nash equilibrium strategies. Finally, we present a modified 8-converging best-response ...
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作者：Osawa, Minoru; Akamatsu, Takashi
作者单位：Tohoku University
摘要：Using the theory of potential games, this paper addresses the emergence of polycentric structures in cities that result from trade-offs between agglomeration economies and congestion effects. We consider a model that explains the formation of multiple business centers in cities as an equilibrium outcome under the presence of households' commuting costs and positive technological externalities between firms. We show that the model is a large-population (non-atomic) potential game. To elucidate ...
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作者：Anderson, Simon P.; Peitz, Martin
作者单位：University of Virginia; University of Mannheim; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：We customize the aggregative game approach to oligopoly to study media platforms which may differ by popularity. Advertiser, platform, and consumer surplus are tied together by a simple summary statistic. When media are ad-financed and ads are a nuisance to consumers we establish see-saws between consumers and advertisers. Entry increases consumer surplus, but decreases advertiser surplus if total platform profits decrease with entry. Merger decreases consumer surplus, but advertiser surplus t...
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作者：Sandholm, William H.; Izquierdo, Segismundo S.; Izquierdo, Luis R.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Universidad de Valladolid; Universidad de Burgos
摘要：We study a family of population game dynamics under which each revising agent randomly selects a set of strategies according to a given test-set rule; tests each strategy in this set a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent; and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest, breaking ties according to a given tie-breaking rule. These dynamics need not respect dominance and related properties except as the number of trials become large....
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作者：Clausen, Andrew; Strub, Carlo
作者单位：University of Edinburgh; University of St Gallen
摘要：Nested optimization problems arise when an agent must take into account the effect of their decisions on their own future behaviour, or the behaviour of others. In these problems, calculating marginal costs and benefits involves differentiating the solutions to nested problems. But are these solutions differentiable functions? We develop a tool called Reverse Calculus, and establish first-order conditions for (i) a Stackel-berg leader considering the follower's best response function, (ii) a s...
