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作者：Mensch, Jeffrey
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Many important economic situations, such as auctions and signaling games, can be modeled as dynamic games of incomplete information with strategic complementarities of actions and types. In this paper, we extend the results of Athey (2001) and Reny (2011) from static Bayesian games to dynamic environments with observable actions, providing conditions that guarantee the existence of monotone equilibria in types in such games. A feature that distinguishes this environment from those of previous ...
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作者：Abdellaoui, Mohammed; Wakker, Peter P.
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
摘要：Savage's foundation of expected utility is considered to be the most convincing justification of Bayesian expected utility and the crowning glory of decision theory. It combines exceptionally appealing axioms with deep mathematics. Despite the wide influence and deep respect that Savage received in economics and statistics, virtually no one touched his mathematical tools. We provide an updated analysis that is more general and more accessible. Our derivations are self-contained. This helps to ...
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作者：Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jorgen W.; Lehmann, Laurent
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Stockholm School of Economics; University of Lausanne
摘要：During human evolution, individuals interacted mostly within small groups that were connected by limited migration and sometimes by conflicts. Which preferences, if any, will prevail in such scenarios? Building on population biology models of spatially structured populations, and assuming individuals' preferences to be their private information, we characterize those preferences that, once established, cannot be displaced by alternative preferences. We represent such uninvadable preferences in...
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作者：Mihm, Maximilian; Toth, Russell
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; University of Sydney
摘要：Social networks support cooperative behavior in a variety of social and economic settings. We study cooperative networks that can be formed when payoff and information asymmetries imply that cooperation relies on unverifiable third-party punishments. Under private monitoring, equilibrium predictions can depend on players' beliefs about unobservable behavior, and our results identify the range of equilibrium network outcomes. In particular, when strategies must be robust to beliefs, we show tha...
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作者：Kishishita, Daiki
作者单位：Tokyo University of Science
摘要：I construct a dynamic delegation model in which a principal can replace the agent to whom to delegate over time. Its unique feature is that the principal dynamically faces a choice between two types of agents with different multidimensional characteristics: experts with uncertain biases and non-experts with no bias. I investigate under what conditions the principal delegates to non-experts by focusing on the effect of the uncertainty regarding preference heterogeneity among experts. Its effect...
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作者：Wang, Zijian
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：This paper examines how multidimensional private information by asset sellers affects market equilibrium. I find that when asset quality is the only source of private information, sellers with high-quality assets signal their quality to buyers through partial retention of assets if and only if their liquidity holdings are large. However, when sellers' valuations of liquid assets are also private information, some sellers with high-quality assets signal their quality even if their liquidity hol...
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作者：Asheim, Geir B.; Bossert, Walter; D'Ambrosio, Conchita; Voegele, Claus
作者单位：University of Oslo; Universite de Montreal; University of Luxembourg
摘要：Resilience has become an important topic in many social sciences. Numerous individual choices and economic and demographic outcomes are likely to be influenced by people's resilience. School performance, work absenteeism and burnout, longevity, the quality of sleep and health-risk behaviors such as substance abuse are some examples. Similarly, it is of high policy relevance to understand the determinants of both individual resilience (such as educational, marital and occupational status) and e...
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作者：Chang, Jen-Wen
作者单位：California State University System; California State University Fullerton
摘要：Do monitoring technologies increase a principal's profits if she has to compete with others for an agent? While monitoring improves the risk-incentive tradeoff, it also reduces the costs for a rivaling principal to offer a more attractive contract. We show in a two-action, two-outcome model that when the derivative of the agent's risk tolerance is smaller than one, equilibrium profits are lower when monitoring is available if there is some competition. When the derivative is larger than one, e...
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作者：Fang, Hanming; Wu, Zenan
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; ShanghaiTech University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Peking University
摘要：We analyze how the life settlement market-the secondary market for life insurance-may affect consumer welfare in a dynamic equilibrium model of life insurance with one-sided commitment and overconfident policyholders. In our model, policyholders may lapse their life insurance policies when they lose their bequest motives; however, they are overconfident in the sense that they may underestimate the probability of losing their bequest motives. We show that in the competitive equilibrium without ...
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作者：Kunimoto, Takashi; Yamashita, Takuro
作者单位：Singapore Management University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：This paper introduces a novel concept of orders on types by which the so-called monotone comparative statics is valid in all supermodular games with incomplete information. We fully characterize this order in terms of what we call common optimism, providing a sense in which our order has a sharp epistemic interpretation. We say that type t(i)' is higher than type t(i) in the order of the common optimism if t(i)' is more optimistic about state than t(i) ; t(i)' is more optimistic that all playe...
