A game of hide and seek in networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bloch, Francis; Dutta, Bhaskar; Dziubinski, Marcin
• 署名单位: heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; Paris School of Economics; University of Warwick; University of Warsaw
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105119
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: Network design; Hide and seek; Covert organizations; networks

摘要

We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We characterize optimal networks for the hider, as well as equilibrium hiding and seeking strategies on these networks. We show that optimal networks are either equivalent to cycles or variants of core-periphery networks where every node in the periphery is connected to a single node in the core. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.