The individualistic foundation of equilibrium distribution

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sun, Xiang; Sun, Yeneng; Yu, Haomiao
• 署名单位: Wuhan University; Wuhan University; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; Toronto Metropolitan University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105083
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: Equilibrium distribution; Large economy; Large game; Lebesgue unit interval; Type-symmetric randomized equilibrium; rich Fubini extension

摘要

This paper proposes a solution concept called the type-symmetric randomized equilibrium (TSRE), where agents with the same type of characteristics take the same randomized choice. It is shown that this solution concept provides a micro-foundation for the macro notion of equilibrium distribution for economies and games with many agents. In particular, any Walrasian (resp. Nash) equilibrium distribution in a large economy (resp. game) is shown to be uniquely determined by one TSRE if the agent space is modeled by the classical Lebesgue unit interval. The relationship of TSRE with other equilibrium notions is also established. (c) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.