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作者：Nielsen, Kirby
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：We present results from a laboratory experiment designed to elicit preferences over the resolution of uncertainty and timing of non-instrumental information acquisition in a rich choice set. Treatments vary whether the uncertainty is framed as a compound lottery or information structure. We find that individuals prefer to delay uncertainty resolution when the choice is framed as a compound lottery and prefer to expedite uncertainty resolution when framed as an information structure. Preference...
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作者：Dong, Feng; Xu, Zhiwei
作者单位：Tsinghua University; Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：We offer a tractable dynamic theory where excessive credit creation by the frictional banking sector may lead to over-investment and then endogenous boom-bust cycles. We formalize the idea in a general equilibrium framework with banks and financially constrained heterogeneous firms. In the static model, a moderate credit expansion has a nonmonotonic positive impact on aggregate output, but an excessive credit expansion can trigger an interbank market crisis and result in a discontinuous sharp ...
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作者：Alon, Shiri; Lehrer, Ehud
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; Tel Aviv University; INSEAD Business School
摘要：Individual decisions are often subjectively affected by other-regarding considerations. We model a decision maker influenced by a grand group of significant others. Each sub-group of significant others is a possible social context, and the decision maker has different preferences in different social contexts. An axiomatic characterization of such preferences is offered. The characterized representation takes a simple subjective utilitarian form: (a) the decision maker ascribes to each signific...
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作者：Feng, Yue; Sabarwal, Tarun
作者单位：Nanjing University; University of Kansas
摘要：Strategic complements are well understood for normal form games, but less so for extensive form games. There is some evidence that extensive form games with strategic complementarities are a very restrictive class of games (Echenique (2004)). We study necessary and sufficient conditions for strategic complements (defined as increasing best responses) in two stage, 2 x 2 games. We find that the restrictiveness imposed by quasisupermodularity and single crossing property is particularly severe, ...
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作者：Chade, Hector; Schlee, Edward E.
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：The standard monopoly insurance model with adverse selection implies that there are always gains to trade, that only the best (unobservable) risks can go uninsured, and that a profit-maximizing menu cannot pool all types. We show that insurance-provision costs can explain both coverage denials only to those likely to be the worst risks and complete pooling. Specifically, we prove a general comparative statics theorem formalizing coverage denials only to those deemed to be the worst risks; and ...
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作者：Ebert, Sebastian; Wei, Wei; Zhou, Xun Yu
作者单位：Frankfurt School Finance & Management; Heriot Watt University; Columbia University
摘要：This paper presents the class of weighted discount functions, which contains the discount functions commonly used in economics and finance. Weighted discount functions may describe the discounting behavior of groups, uncertainty about what discount rate to use, present-biased time preferences, and all of these simultaneously. As an application, we study investment behavior under weighted discounting and come up with the following general result: Greater group diversity, greater parameter uncer...
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作者：Lebeau, Lucie
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：This paper formalizes a Nash bargaining game between two players constrained by capacity decisions made prior to entering the negotiation. In equilibrium, strategic interactions drive capacity choices to zero and shut trade down despite the existence of gains from trade. The game is embedded in a general equilibrium model of decentralized asset trade with credit frictions to investigate the interaction between availability of credit and investors' participation, modeled through their choices o...
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作者：Spiro, Daniel
作者单位：Uppsala University
摘要：This paper explores intergenerational transmission of culture and the consequences of a plausible assumption: that people care not only for their children's culture but also for how their grandchildren and later generations are raised. This departs from the previous literature which, without exception, assumes parents either do not care about, or fail to consider, the effect their actions have on all future generations. The current paper models a sequential game where parents take actions trad...
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作者：Chen, Yi
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：A revision game of experimentation is examined in which players search for an unknown threshold. Each player encounters individual random opportunities to revise her own action. Lower action saves flow cost, but the player whose action falls below the threshold suffers a costly breakdown and exits the game. The set of symmetric pure-strategy Markov equilibria has a simple characterization. The difference between these equilibria vanishes as the revision opportunity becomes infinitely frequent....
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作者：Li, Yunan
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong
摘要：A principal allocates an object (e.g., a job or grant) among several agents, each of whom wants the object and privately knows the value to the principal of assigning it to him. The object is allocated based on the agents' reports. The principal can choose to inspect an agent's report at a cost and impose a limited punishment on the one who receives the object. An optimal mechanism specifies two thresholds upsilon(l) <= upsilon(u). If every agent reports a value below upsilon(l), the object is...
