(Not) delegating decisions to experts: The effect of uncertainty

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kishishita, Daiki
• 署名单位: Tokyo University of Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105117
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: Dynamic delegation; experts; Agency problems; ambiguity; populism

摘要

I construct a dynamic delegation model in which a principal can replace the agent to whom to delegate over time. Its unique feature is that the principal dynamically faces a choice between two types of agents with different multidimensional characteristics: experts with uncertain biases and non-experts with no bias. I investigate under what conditions the principal delegates to non-experts by focusing on the effect of the uncertainty regarding preference heterogeneity among experts. Its effect is different depending on the type of uncertainty: an increase in risk and in ambiguity (i.e., Knightian uncertainty) work in opposite directions with higher ambiguity rather than risk being a source of the delegation to non-experts. This analysis sheds new light on the sources of anti-elitism in politics. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.