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作者：Shell, Karl
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：This introduces the 50th anniversary issue of JET, a collection of 50 influential articles published in the Journal over the first fifty years. These papers speak for themselves. Instead of summarizing them, I offer my takes on the histories of the Journal, scientific publishing, and the economic theory profession. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Alaoui, Larbi; Janezic, Katharina A.; Penta, Antonio
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：Recent experiments suggest that level-k behavior is often driven by subjects' beliefs, rather than their binding cognitive bounds. But the extent to which this is true in general is not completely understood, mainly because disentangling 'cognitive' and 'behavioral' levels is challenging experimentally and theoretically. In this paper we provide a simple experimental design strategy (the 'tutorial method') to disentangle the two concepts purely based on subjects' choices. We also provide a 're...
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作者：Ghirardato, Paolo; Pennesi, Daniele
作者单位：University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto; University of Turin
摘要：We provide, and characterize behaviorally, a framework for constructing subjective mixtures which requires neither the Certainty Independence nor the Monotonicity axiom, replacing them with much weaker local properties. As we also show by means of examples, this framework provides a purely subjective foundation to most of the recent preference models which employ the Anscombe-Aumann setting. It also allows a subjective formulation of a preference for ambiguity hedging, and as a consequence all...
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作者：Richter, Michael; Rubinstein, Ariel
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Tel Aviv University; New York University
摘要：In many economic situations, neither prices nor authority rules. Rather, individual behavior is governed by social norms that specify what is allowed (socially acceptable) and what is forbidden (socially unacceptable). These norms can emerge in a decentralized way and can serve as a method to bring order to economic situations. The key component of our solution concept is a uniform permissible set which plays a role parallel to that of a price system in competitive equilibrium. The concept is ...
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作者：Gale, Douglas; Gottardi, Piero
作者单位：New York University; University of Essex; Universita Ca Foscari Venezia; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; New York University; University of Essex
摘要：We develop a general equilibrium theory of the capital structures of banks and firms. The liquidity services of bank deposits make deposits a cheaper source of funding than equity. In equilibrium, banks pass on part of this funding advantage in the form of lower interest rates to firms that borrow from them. Firms and banks choose their capital structures to balance the benefits of debt financing against the risk of costly default. An increase in the equity of a firm makes its debt less risky ...
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作者：Burkett, Justin; Woodward, Kyle
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We model multi-unit auctions in which bidders' valuations are multidimensional private information. Under a natural constraint on aggregate demand we show that the last accepted bid uniform-pricing rule admits a unique equilibrium with a simple characterization: bids are identical to those submitted in a single-unit first price auction. The form of equilibrium bids suggests that last accepted bid uniform-pricing is a generalization of single-unit first-pricing: in both auctions winners pay the...
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作者：Gorno, Leandro; Iachan, Felipe S.
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：We study a research and development race by extending the standard investment under uncertainty framework. Each firm observes the stochastic evolution of a new product's expected profitability and chooses the optimal time to release it. Firms are imperfectly informed about the state of their opponents, who could move first and capture the market. We characterize a family of priors for which the game admits a stationary equilibrium. In this case, the equilibrium is unique and can be explicitly ...
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作者：Bernhardt, Dan; Liu, Tingjun; Sogo, Takeharu
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Warwick; University of Hong Kong; SKEMA Business School; Universite Cote d'Azur
摘要：We analyze optimal auction mechanisms when bidders base costly entry decisions on their valuations, and bidders pay with a fixed royalty rate plus cash. With sufficient valuation uncertainty relative to entry costs, the optimal mechanism features asymmetry so that bidders enter with strictly positive but different (ex-ante) probabilities. When bidders are ex-ante identical, higher royalty rates-which tie payments more closely to bidder valuations-increase the optimal degree of asymmetry in auc...
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作者：Adriani, Fabrizio; Sonderegger, Silvia
作者单位：University of Leicester; University of Nottingham
摘要：We use a simple cost-benefit analysis to derive optimal similarity judgments - addressing the question: when should we expect a decision maker to distinguish between different time periods or different prizes? Our key premise is that cognitive resources are costly and are to be deployed only where they really matter. We show that this simple insight can explain a number of observed anomalies, such as: (i) time inconsistency, (ii) magnitude effects, (iii) interval length effects. For each of th...
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作者：Rostek, Marzena
