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作者：Ahn, David S.; Iijima, Ryota; Sarver, Todd
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Yale University; Duke University
摘要：We introduce and characterize a recursive model of dynamic choice that accommodates naivete about present bias. While recursive representations are important for infinite-horizon problems, the commonly used Strotz model of time inconsistency presents well-known technical difficulties that preclude such representations. Our model incorporates costly self-control in the sense of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) to overcome these hurdles. The important novel condition is an axiom for naivete. We first ...
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作者：Kolb, Aaron; Conitzer, Vincent
作者单位：Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington; Duke University
摘要：We analyze cheap talk warnings about a strategic adversary, with applications to cybersecurity and national security. Each period an expert receives a noisy private signal about whether an attack by the adversary is feasible. The expert wants to warn a decision maker while also maintaining credibility for future warnings, but unlike in a standard cheap talk game, the adversary can undermine the expert's credibility by delaying attack. While such delays increase warning fatigue, they also make ...
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作者：Bjerre-Nielsen, Andreas
作者单位：University of Copenhagen
摘要：This paper investigates endogenous network formation by heterogeneous agents. The agents' types determine the value of linking and we incorporate spillovers as utility from indirect connections. We provide sufficient conditions for a class of networks with sorting to be stable for low to moderate spillovers; with only two types these networks are the unique pairwise stable ones. We also show that this sorting is suboptimal for moderate to high spillovers despite otherwise obeying the condition...
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作者：Chade, Hector; Swinkels, Jeroen
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Northwestern University
摘要：We study the moral-hazard problem when the agent's reservation utility is large, but so is the agent's value to the principal. We show that the principal's cost of implementing effort has a very simple limiting form. For large enough outside option, the principal's cost is convex in the action, so the optimally-implemented action is unique, and optimal effort rises with the agent's ability, and falls with the agent's wealth and outside option. In a competitive market setting where heterogenous...
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作者：Albrecht, James; Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; Vroman, Susan
作者单位：Georgetown University; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Peking University; Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School (PKU Shenzhen); Tinbergen Institute; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We consider a labor market with search frictions in which workers make multiple applications and firms can post and commit to general mechanisms that may be conditioned both on the number of applications received and on the number of offers received by the firm's candidate. When the contract space includes application fees, there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria of which only one is efficient, and it has a posted wage equal to match output. In the inefficient equilibria, the wage is ...
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作者：March, Christoph; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony
作者单位：Queens University Belfast
摘要：We report a laboratory experiment that tests the causal impact of altruism on observational learning behavior. Once endowed with a private signal, subjects submit their guess about the payoff-relevant state in two parallel sequences. In the observed sequence, guesses are revealed publicly so that subjects in both sequences can benefit from guesses that are informative. Unobserved guesses, on the other hand, never reveal any information to others as they remain private. We find that observed gu...
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作者：Heller, Yuval; Sturrock, David
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; University of London; University College London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We present a novel mechanism that explains how nonenforceable communication about future actions has the capacity to improve efficiency. We explore a two-player partnership game where each player, before choosing a level of effort to exert on a joint project, makes a cheap talk promise to his partner about his own future effort. We allow agents to incur a psychological cost of reneging on their promises. We demonstrate a strong tendency for evolutionary processes to select agents who incur int...
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作者：Airaudo, Marco
作者单位：Drexel University
摘要：Motivated by the extensive experimental and empirical evidence on preference reversal in consumption choices, we introduce temptation with self-control preferences into a New Keynesian model to study the effects of forward guidance in monetary policy, and the related forward guidance puzzle. In our setup, the representative agent faces a trade off between the temptation for immediate satisfaction (liquidate wealth) with his long-run best (smooth consumption), which he manages by exerting cogni...
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作者：Dziewulski, Pawel
作者单位：University of Sussex
摘要：Despite its ad hoc nature and lack of an appealing economic interpretation, the critical cost-efficiency index (or CCEI) proposed in Afriat (1973) is one of the most widespread measures of departures from rationality. In this paper, we provide a behavioural foundation for this index by showing that it is equivalent to a notion of the just-noticeable difference - a measure of dissimilarity between alternatives that is sufficient for the agent to tell them apart. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All right...
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作者：Zannini, Ugo
作者单位：Luiss Guido Carli University; Luiss Guido Carli University
摘要：In a monetary economy a la Williamson (2012), in which a competitive financial sector insures agents facing idiosyncratic liquidity risk on interest-bearing assets, we introduce a competitive market for liquidity reallocation and study optimal policy. We show that, at any inflation rate above the Friedman rule, the market is a welfare-improving risk-sharing mechanism over Williamson's (2012) deposit contract. The optimal policy requires real asset scarcity, which increases the demand for money...
