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作者：Piacquadio, Paolo G.
作者单位：University of Oslo
摘要：This paper addresses the evaluation of intergenerational allocations in an uncertain world. It axiomatically characterizes a class of criteria, named reference-dependent utilitarian, that assess allocations relative to a stochastic reference. The characterized criteria combine social concerns for ex-ante equity capturing the idea that generations should be treated equitably before risk is resolved and for ex-post fairness capturing the idea that generations should be treated equitably after ri...
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作者：Basu, Pathikrit; Chatterjee, Kalyan; Hoshino, Tetsuya; Tamuz, Omer
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true state from private signals, as well as the actions of others. They commonly learn the true state (Cripps et al., 2008), but do not coordinate in every equilibrium. We show that there exist stable equilibria in which players can overcome unfavorable signal real...
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作者：Hu, Tai-Wei; Rocheteau, Guillaume
作者单位：University of Bristol; University of California System; University of California Irvine; Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas
摘要：We provide unified strategic foundations for the Nash (1950) and Kalai (1977) solutions in the context of negotiations under liquidity constraints. We propose an N-round game where in each round a seller and a buyer with limited payment capacity negotiate a bundle of divisible goods, where bundle sizes can vary across rounds, according to Rubinstein's (1982) alternating-offer game. The game implements the Nash solution if N = 1 and the Kalai solution if N = +infinity and bundle sizes are infin...
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作者：Koch, Alexander K.; Nafziger, Julia
作者单位：Aarhus University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Aarhus University
摘要：We study theoretically and experimentally how the bracketing of non-binding goals in a repeated task affects the level of goals that people set for themselves, the actual effort provided, and the pattern of effort over time. In our model, a sophisticated or partially naive individual sets either daily or weekly goals to overcome a motivational problem caused by present-biased preferences. In an online, real-effort experiment, we randomly allocated subjects to treatments where they set either d...
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作者：Angeletos, George-Marios; Iovino, Luigi; La'O, Jennifer
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Columbia University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：This paper studies the policy implications of the endogeneity of information about the state of the economy. The business cycle can be made less noisy, and more efficient, by incentivizing firms to vary their pricing and production decisions more with their beliefs about the state of the economy. This calls for countercyclical taxes complemented by a monetary policy that leans against the wind. The optimal policies trade-off allocative efficiency for informational efficiency. (C) 2020 Elsevier...
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作者：Mueller, Christoph
作者单位：University of Queensland
摘要：We examine a strong form of robust implementation in dynamic mechanisms that is both belief- and belief-revision-free. Specifically, we characterize robust wPBE-implementation, that is, full implementation in weak Perfect Bayesian equilibrium across all type spaces. We introduce a dynamic robust monotonicity condition that is weaker than Bergemann and Morris' (2011) robust monotonicity condition and show that under a conditional no total indifference condition, ex-post incentive compatibility ...
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作者：Drugov, Mikhail; Ryvkin, Dmitry
作者单位：New Economic School; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：It is commonly understood that making a tournament ranking process more noisy leads to a reduction in effort exerted by players in the tournament. But what exactly does it mean to have more noise? We address this question and show that the level of risk, as measured by the variance or the second-order stochastic dominance order, is not the answer, in general. For rank-order tournaments with arbitrary prizes, equilibrium effort decreases as noise becomes more dispersed, in the sense of the disp...
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作者：Kazumura, Tomoya; Mishra, Debasis; Serizawa, Shigehiro
作者单位：Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; University of Osaka
摘要：A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents, who can buy at most one object. Each agent's preference over (object, payment) pairs need not be quasilinear. The seller considers the following desiderata for her mechanism, which she terms desirable: (1) strategy-proofness, (2) ex post individual rationality, (3) equal treatment of equals, (4) no wastage (every object is allocated to some agent). The minimum Walrasian equilibrium price (MWEP) mechanism is desirable. We show that at eac...
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作者：Kubler, Felix; Selden, Larry; Wei, Xiao
作者单位：University of Zurich; Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); Columbia University; Fudan University; Shanghai Institute of International Finance & Economics
摘要：What does utility maximization subject to a budget constraint imply for intertemporal choice under uncertainty? Assuming consumers face a two period consumption-portfolio problem where asset markets are incomplete, we address this question following both the standard local infinitesimal and finite data approaches. To focus on the separate roles of time and risk preferences, individuals maximize KPS (Kreps- Porteus-Selden) preferences. The consumption-portfolio problem is decomposed into a one ...
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作者：Khalil, Fahad; Lawarree, Jacques; Rodivilov, Alexander
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Stevens Institute of Technology
摘要：Before embarking on a project, a principal must often rely on an agent to learn about its profitability. We model this learning as a two-armed bandit problem and highlight the interaction between learning (experimentation) and production. We derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about the efficiency of experimentation. This private information in the experimentation stage generates asymmetric information in the production sta...
