The permissible and the forbidden

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Richter, Michael; Rubinstein, Ariel
• 署名单位: University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Tel Aviv University; New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105042
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: Y-equilibrium; general equilibrium; social norms; convexity; Envy-free

摘要

In many economic situations, neither prices nor authority rules. Rather, individual behavior is governed by social norms that specify what is allowed (socially acceptable) and what is forbidden (socially unacceptable). These norms can emerge in a decentralized way and can serve as a method to bring order to economic situations. The key component of our solution concept is a uniform permissible set which plays a role parallel to that of a price system in competitive equilibrium. The concept is analyzed and applied to a variety of economic and social settings. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.