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作者：Dziubinski, Marcin; Goyal, Sanjeev; Minarsch, David E. N.
作者单位：University of Warsaw; University of Cambridge; University of Cambridge
摘要：This paper develops a theoretical framework for the study of war and conquest. The analysis highlights the role of three factors - the technology of war, resources, and contiguity network - in shaping the dynamics of appropriation and the formation of empires. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Salamanca, Andres
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：This paper characterizes optimal mediation in sender-receiver games. We assume that the mediator's objective is to maximize the ex-ante welfare of the sender. Mediated equilibria are defined by a set of linear incentive constraints. The Lagrange multipliers associated with these constraints yield shadow prices that are used to construct virtual utility functions that intuitively characterize the signaling costs of incentive compatibility. Importantly, we characterize the value of an optimal me...
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作者：Au, Pak Hung; Chen, Bin R.
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Huazhong University of Science & Technology
摘要：Evidence for positive peer effects in production has been well-documented in empirical studies, and these effects are found to be more significant in teams composed of members with heterogeneous abilities. By modeling peer effect as mutual monitoring between members, we show that the total agency cost is minimized by maximizing skill diversities in the teams. This result provides a novel explanation for why worker heterogeneity can strengthen peer effects. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights res...
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作者：Stachurski, John; Toda, Alexis Akira
作者单位：Australian National University; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This note corrects the proof of Proposition 5 in Stachurski and Toda (2019), which shows that the consumption function has an explicit linear lower bound and is used to prove their main result that wealth inherits the tail behavior of income in Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari models. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Kim, Jinwoo; Koh, Youngwoo
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU); Seoul National University (SNU); Hanyang University
摘要：We study a simple auction model with interdependent values in which there are two bidders each of whom observes a binary signal and can learn rival's information at a cost, whereafter they compete in the first-price or second-price auction. We characterize a unique symmetric equilibrium strategy-learning and bidding strategies-for the two auction formats. In the first-price auction, bidders with high signal learn rival's information with higher probability than those with low signal do. In the...
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作者：Denderski, Piotr; Stoltenberg, Christian A.
作者单位：University of Leicester; Polish Academy of Sciences; Institute of Economics of the Polish Academy of Sciences; University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：In this paper, we revisit the conventional view on efficient risk sharing that advance information on future shocks is detrimental to welfare. In our model, risk-averse agents receive private and public signals on future income realizations and engage in insurance contracts with limited enforceability. Consistent with the conventional view, better private and public signals are detrimental to welfare when only one type of signal is informative. Our main novel result applies when both signals a...
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作者：Pablo Arribillaga, R.; Masso, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro
作者单位：Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We characterize the set of all obviously strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Since obvious strategy-proofness implies strategy-proofness, and the set of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on this domain coincides with the class of generalized median voter schemes, we focus on this class. We identify a condition on generalized median voter schemes for which the following characterization holds. A generalized median voter schem...
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作者：Dur, Umut; Pathak, Parag A.; Sonmez, Tayfun
作者单位：North Carolina State University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Boston College
摘要：Prohibitions on using race in affirmative action have spurred a number of admissions systems to adopt race-neutral alternatives that encourage diversity without appearing to explicitly advantage any particular group. The new affirmative action system for Chicago's exam schools reserves seats for students based on their neighborhood and leaves the rest to be assigned via merit. Neighborhoods are divided into four tiers based on an index of socioeconomic disadvantage. At each school, an equal fr...
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作者：Li, Jian; Zhou, Junjie
作者单位：Iowa State University; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper examines the robustness of Lehmann's ranking of experiments (Lehmann, 1988) for decision-makers who are uncertainty averse a la Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011). We show that, assuming commitment, for all uncertainty-averse indices satisfying some mild assumptions, Lehmann's informativeness ranking is equivalent to the induced uncertainty-averse value ranking of experiments for all agents with single-crossing vNM utility indices (Theorem 1). Moreover, Lehmann's ranking can also be dete...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Castro, Francisco; Weintraub, Gabriel Y.
作者单位：Yale University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Stanford University
摘要：We study the classic sequential screening problem in the presence of ex post participation constraints. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions that determine when the optimal selling mechanism is either static or sequential. In the static contract, the buyers are not screened with respect to their interim type and the object is sold at a posted price. In the sequential contract, the buyers are screened with respect to their interim type and a menu of quantities is offered. We complet...
