Localized perfection

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Enxian; Qiao, Lei; Sun, Xiang; Sun, Yeneng
• 署名单位: Nankai University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Wuhan University; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106183
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: PROPER EQUILIBRIA; refinements; INFORMATION

摘要

Perfect equilibrium and its refinements are widely studied and typically rely on full-support perturbations. We introduce a S-localized notion of perfection for games with a continuum of players. It confines perturbations within a S-neighborhood of the underlying action distribution and eliminates undesirable equilibria from a local perspective. We establish the existence of a pure strategy S-localized perfect equilibrium and show that it is equivalent to S-admissible Nash equilibrium. We also study limit versions of S-localized perfection. Illustrative applications to large routing games and crowd saturation games are presented.