When speed is of essence: perishable goods auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hafalir, Isa; Kesten, Onur; Sherstyuk, Katerina; Tao, Cong
• 署名单位: University of Technology Sydney; University of Sydney; University of Hawaii System; University of Hawaii Manoa; Zhejiang University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106149
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: dutch; collusion; MARKETS; NORMS; money; time

摘要

We study a remarkable auction used in several fish markets around the world, notably in Honolulu and Sydney, whereby high-quality fish are sold fast through a hybrid auction that combines the Dutch and the English formats in one auction. Speedy sales are of essence for these perishable goods. Our theoretical model incorporating time costs demonstrates that such Honolulu-Sydney auction is preferred by the auctioneer over the Dutch auction when there are few bidders or when bidders have high time costs. Our laboratory experiments confirm that with a small number of bidders, Honolulu-Sydney auctions are significantly faster than Dutch auctions. Bidders overbid in Dutch, benefiting the auctioneer, while the Honolulu-Sydney format benefits bidders more compared to Dutch across all treatments. We further observe bidder attempts to tacitly lower prices in Honolulu-Sydney auctions, substantiating existing concerns about pricing in some fish markets.