Classical matching via network formation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sadler, Evan
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106208
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: stability; MODEL; residents; EXISTENCE

摘要

Despite addressing similar underlying questions, the literatures on network formation and matching have evolved more or less independently. This paper offers a common framework, studying a general model of network formation without externalities-equivalently, a one-sided many-to-many matching model. I give conditions for the existence and uniqueness of stable graphs, I prove a rural hospital theorem, and I highlight a link-by-link conflict of interest across different stable graphs. Special cases contain and extend classic results for the roommate problem and two-sided matching markets. An iterated deletion algorithm adapted from Gutin et al. (2023) furnishes a crucial tool, reducing network formation games to a normal form with helpful properties.