The emergence and persistence of oligarchy: A dynamic model of endogenous political power

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jeon, Jee Seon; Hwang, Ilwoo
• 署名单位: Seoul National University (SNU)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105437
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: Dynamic bargaining; Endogenous political power; Endogenous institution; Markov perfect equilibrium; Oligarchy

摘要

We study an infinite-horizon multilateral bargaining game in which the status quo policy, players' recognition probabilities, and their voting weights are endogenously determined by the previous bargaining outcome. With players not discounting future payoffs, we show that the long-run equilibrium outcome features the concentration of power by one or two players, depending on the initial bargaining state. If the players' initial shares are relatively equal, they successfully prevent tyranny, but a two-player oligarchy nevertheless emerges and persists. The same results are obtained with payoff discounting, provided that the players' shares are not too small. Our results highlight the importance of the initial power distribution and discounting of future payoffs in the long-run development of power configuration. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.