Farsighted objections and maximality in one-to-one matching problems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kimya, Mert
• 署名单位: University of Sydney
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105499
• 发表日期: 2022
• 关键词: Farsighted stability; Matching problems; stable set

摘要

We characterize the set of stable matchings when individuals are farsighted and when they choose their objections optimally along a farsighted objection path. We use a solution concept called maximal farsighted set (MFS), which is an adaptation of the concepts developed in Dutta and Vohra (2017) and Dutta and Vartiainen (2020) to one-to-one matching problems. MFS always exists, but it need not be unique. There is a unique largest MFS that contains all other, which is equal to the largest consistent set of Chwe (1994). This implies that the largest consistent set embodies the idea of maximality in one-to-one matching problems. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.