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作者：BENPORATH, E; GILBOA, I
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：This paper provides an axiomatization of linear inequality measures representing binary relations on the subspace of income profiles having identical total income. Interpreting the binary relation as a policymaker's preference, we extend the axioms to the whole space and find that they characterize linear social evaluation functions. The axiomatization seems to suggest that a policymaker who has a linear measure of inequality on a subspace should have a linear evaluation on the whole space. An...
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作者：HILLAS, J
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University
摘要：A stable set of beliefs is defined to be a subset of the set of sequential equilibria such that for any equilibrium in the subset the beliefs and/or actions at any information set should be consistent with the equilibria in the subset that reach that information set. Further, any sequential equilibrium that is not in the subset disagrees, at some unreached information set, with the equilibria of the subset that do reach that information set. The behavior of this solution is examined in a numbe...
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作者：WRIGHT, R
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis
摘要：Search models can generate an endogenous role for fiat money, in the sense that there exist equilibria where intrisically useless, unbacked, paper currency is valed due to its function as a medium of exchange. In this note, I ask if there exist sunspot equilibria in these models, where the value or acceptability of money fluctuates along with extrinsic random events even though the fundamentals of the economy are deterministic and time invariant. The answer is yes.
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作者：ARAUJO, A; MONTEIRO, PK
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation; Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro
摘要：This paper deals with the existence of equilibria with infinitely many goods. Its main goal is to show that when restricted to the set of feasible allocations there exists an economically meaningful price (in the sense that a price in L1 is economically meaningful but a purely finitely additive measure is not). We cover both the L(p) (1 less-than-or-equal-to p less-than-or-equal-to infinity) and M(K) cases. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：BOHM, V
摘要：It is shown why different price normalization rules influence oligopolistic equilibria in general equilibrium models. This is done for the Roberts and Sonnenschein duopoly and for a price duopoly in an exchange economy. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：HE, H; HUANG, CF
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study a problem that is the ''inverse'' of Merton [J. Econ. Theory 3 (1971), 373-413]. For a given consumption-portfolio policy, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for it to be optimal for ''some'' agent with an increasing, strictly concave, time-additive, and state-independent utility function when the risky asset price follows a general difussion process. These conditions involve a set of consistency and state independency conditions and a partial differential equation satisfi...
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作者：KRANICH, L
摘要：Goldman (Gift equilibria and Pareto optimality, J. Econ. Theory 18, 1978, 368-370) demonstrated that the Second Welfare Theorem generally fails to hold in economies in which benevolent agents are permitted to make gifts. In this brief note, we point out that for the class of economies considered by Goldman, symmetry and a slight bias in favor of one's own consumption restore the Second Welfare Theorem.
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作者：WINTER, E
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：The joint production of a single output from a single input by a group of potential users of a technology is usually analyzed in the literature using a ''cooperative'' approach. We provide an analysis for such economies by means of non-cooperative bargaining. Two bargaining models are analyzed, one based on demands the other on proposals. We show that the convexity of the production function implies that subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of these bargaining games are coalition stable, (i.e....
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作者：CHWE, MSY
摘要：I define the largest consistent set, a solution concept which applies to situations in which coalitions freely form but cannot make binding contracts, act publicly, and are fully ''farsighted'' in that a coalition considers the possibility that, once it acts, another coalition might react, a third coalition might in turn react, and so on, without limit. I establish weak nonemptiness conditions and apply it to strategic and coalitional form games and majority rule voting. I argue that it improv...
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作者：LANDSBERGER, M; MEILIJSON, I
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：This paper considers a profit maximizing monopolistic insurer who offers insurance to two types of risk averse agents in an environment where the uninsured position has the same distribution across types, agents' utility functions are private information, and types are independently and identically distributed. We prove that if there is no lower bound on liability and the types differ markedly in their attitudes to heavy losses, the insurer can extract almost all rent by offering full insuranc...
