NORMAL-FORM STRUCTURES IN EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
MAILATH, GJ; SAMUELSON, L; SWINKELS, JM
署名单位：
University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Northwestern University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1994.1072
发表日期：
1994
页码：
325-371
关键词：
摘要：
Normal form information sets capture situations in which players can make certain decisions as if they knew their opponents had chosen from a particular subset of their strategies. In this paper, we say that an extensive form game represents a normal form game if, for each such situation, the corresponding choice in the extensive form is made with the player knowing that the opponents have chosen from the relevant subset. We develop an algorithm that generates a representation whenever one exists and present a necessary and sufficient condition for a normal form game to be representable. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.