ENDOGENOUS AVAILABILITY, CARTELS, AND MERGER IN AN EQUILIBRIUM PRICE DISPERSION
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
MCAFEE, RP
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1994.1002
发表日期：
1994
页码：
24-47
关键词：
摘要：
In a generalization of the Butters advertising model, the equilibrium involves one firm that advertises at least twice as much as the others, who all advertise equally. A cartel formation game is considered, and any equilibrium cartel involves at least two, but generally not all, firms. In one equilibrium, only the largest firms join the cartel. A merger game is considered. and, in equilibrium, the large film buys the other films in sequence, with discounting equalizing the expected utility of the targets and prices rising over time. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.