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作者：DUTTA, B; SEN, A
摘要：We demonstrate the existence of a social choice function in an environment where there are two outcomes and two players each of whom can be of two types, which can only be implemented in Bayesian-Nash equilibrium by a mechanism where both players have an infinite number of messages. This stands in dramatic contrast to the case of Nash implementation in complete information, finite environments.
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作者：EVANS, GW; HONKAPOHJA, S
作者单位：University of Helsinki
摘要：We examine local stability under learning of stationary Markov sunspot equilibria (SSEs) in a simple dynamic nonlinear model. Necessary and sufficient conditions for local convergence of a recursive learning algorithm to SSEs are shown to be given (generically) by expectational stability (E-stability) conditions. We distinguish between weak and strong E-stability, where the latter requires stability also with respect to overparametrizations of the sunspot solution. Economic applications are gi...
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作者：LUENBERGER, DG
摘要：This paper presents two, mutually dual, optimization principles, termed the zero-maximum principle and the zero-minimum principle, respectively, that characterize economic equilibria. The first of these principles states an equivalence between equilibrium allocations and allocations that maximize total societal benefit and make that benefit zero. The second principle states an equivalence between equilibrium price vectors and price vectors that minimize the total economic surplus and make that...
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作者：CONLEY, JP
摘要：It is shown if all consumers are either asymptotically satiated or strictly nonsatiated in public goods, then the core converges to the Lindahl allocations as the economy grow without bound. Asymptotic satiation implies that only a vanishing fraction of the private good is devoted to public goods production as the economy gets large. Strict nonsatiation, on the other hand, implies that essentially all of the private good is devoted to public goods production in the limit. It is interesting tha...
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作者：DIAMANTARAS, D; WILKIE, S
作者单位：Telcordia Technologies
摘要：We introduce an extension of Kaneko's ratio equilibrium to the case of economies with many public and private goods. Specifically, we employ a general production model where public goods may be inputs in the production of public goods. Using the accounting concept of transfer prices, we propose a definition of ratio equilibrium that generalizes Kaneko's. We prove that, under standard assumptions, ratio equilibria exist and are free-access core allocations and therefore Pareto efficient.
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作者：BORGERS, T
摘要：Considering finite normal-form games, we assume that players maximise expected utility, that they hold beliefs with full support, and that these facts are ''approximate common knowledge'' among players. We show that players satisfy these assumptions if and only if they choose strategies that survive the following procedure: first, all weakly dominated strategies are eliminated, and then strongly dominated strategies are iteratively eliminated. This procedure is due to E. Dekel and D. Fudenberg...
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作者：BERKOWITZ, D
摘要：For general restrictions on the discount rate and factor intensities Benhabib and Nishimura [J. Econ. Theory 35 (1985), 284-306], Boldrin [Paths of optimal accumulation in two-sector models, in ''Economic Complexity: Chaos, Sunspots, Bubbles and Nonlinearity'' (W. Barnett, J. Geweke, and K. Shell, Eds.), 231-252, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge], and Boldrin and Deneckere [J. Econ. Dynam. Control 14 (1990), 627-653] generate pareto-efficient cycles in two-sector models of competitive economie...
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作者：ESTEBAN, J; MITRA, T; RAY, D
作者单位：Cornell University; Boston University
摘要：This paper is concerned with the characterization of public debt policies that are consistent with competitive equilibria in which (i)money is positively priced, and (ii)intertemporal allocation is efficient. The framework used is an overlapping generations model with many goods, agents with two-period lifetimes, and nonstationary tax-transfer policies. We show, under some regularity conditions on such policies that the size of the public debt not growing ''too fast'' is both necessary and suf...
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作者：ABREU, D; MATSUSHIMA, H
作者单位：University of Tsukuba
摘要：We study implementation of social choice functions when the planner can randomize and impose arbitrarily small fines on players. In complete information environments with three or more players, it is shown that any social choice function is exactly implementable in iteratively weakly undominated strategies. The mechanisms used are finite and robust to the order of removal of dominated strategies.
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作者：RIVARD, BA
摘要：This paper constructs a simple overlapping generations model with money and production in an environment of monopolistically competitive firms and an increasing returns to scale production technology. Within this framework symmetric stationary sunspot equilibria are generated without requiring the assumption of gross complementarity between future consumption and current leisure. Output fluctuations may also be highly persistent in this model.
