INCENTIVE-CONSISTENT MATCHING PROCESSES FOR PROBLEMS WITH EX-ANTE PRICING
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
PETERS, M
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1994.1056
发表日期：
1994
页码：
103-114
关键词：
摘要：
In a non-stationary matching problem sellers can compete for potential trading partners by making ex ante pprice offers publicly before the matching process occurs in each period. This paper introduces the concept of an incentive-consistent matching technology in which buyers have no incentive to modify the allocation generated by the matching technology when there is a price deviation. It is shown that when the matching technology is incentive-consistent all trades must occur at prices close to the Walrasian price when transactions costs are small.