DUAL PARETO-EFFICIENCY
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
LUENBERGER, DG
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1994.1004
发表日期：
1994
页码：
70-85
关键词：
摘要：
Consider an economy with d commodities and n individuals. A pair (p, M), where p is a price vector and M = (m1, m2, ..., m(n)) is a set of n individual income levels, defines a set of individual budget constraints. It is known that such pairs provide a framework for duality-based investigations of Pareto efficient allocations and of equilibria. This paper employs this framework in a general setting, not requiring smoothness or boundedness of budget sets, to develop duals of the first and second theorems of welfare economics. Namely, under suitable assumptions: (1) the price-income pair associated with any equilibrium is dual Pareto efficient, and (2) corresponding to any dual Pareto-efficient pair, there is an allocation which together with the given prices forms an equilibrium. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.