2ND PRICE AUCTIONS WITHOUT EXPECTED UTILITY
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
NEILSON, WS
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1994.1007
发表日期：
1994
页码：
136-151
关键词：
摘要：
Expected utility maximizers bid according to dominant strategies in second price auctions for risky prizes, bids are independent of the number of other bidders or the reserve price. the optimal reserve price is independent of the number of bidders, and ascending bid and second price auctions generate the same expected revenue. If expected utility fails, none of these results remain true, and symmetric equilibria may not be unique. If fanning in and betweenness hold, uniquenes is restored, bids fall when the number of bidders or the reserve price increases and second price auctions generate higher bids than ascending bid auctions. (C) 1994 Academic Press, Inc.