A MARKET TO IMPLEMENT THE CORE
成果类型：
Note
署名作者：
SERRANO, R
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1075
发表日期：
1995
页码：
285-294
关键词：
摘要：
I present a mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes coincide with the core of an underlying convex TU game. The mechanism resembles an asset market, in which one of the players is randomly selected as a broker who centralizes trade. In addition, the rules of the mechanism are independent of the coalitional function. Therefore, the mechanism is useful for an incompletely informed designer who wishes to implement the core of these games. The mechanism is inspired by the reduced games relevant for the consistency of the core. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.