Multilateral bargaining with imperfect information
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Baliga, S; Serrano, R
署名单位：
Brown University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1995.1087
发表日期：
1995
页码：
578-589
关键词：
摘要：
We study a multilateral procedure in which responders are told only their own shares. The proposal becomes common knowledge after the response stags and responders have optimistic beliefs after off-equilibrium offers. When discounting is high, the set of equilibrium agreements is a singleton; when it is low. there is a large multiplicity of equilibrium payoffs. In contrast to earlier work, our multiple equilibria are constructed by using strategy profiles in which a responder rejects any offer that reduces his or her own share. (C) 1995 Academic Press Inc.