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作者：LEWBEL, A; PERRAUDIN, W
作者单位：University of Cambridge
摘要：Necessary and sufficient restrictions upon arbitrary utility functions for portfolio separation for any degree are derived for complete markets, generalizing the expected utility theorems of Cass and Stiglitz (J. Econ. Theory 2 (1970), 122-160). Portfolio separation is shown to be nearly synonymous with Lewbel's (Econometrica 59 (1991), 711-730) definition of demand rank, which is characterized using standard duality methods. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：Jehiel, P
摘要：In two-player infinite-horizon alternating-move games, a limited forecast(n(1),n(2))-equilibrium is such that (1) player i chooses actions according to his n(1)-length forecasts so as to maximize the average payoff over the forthcoming n(i) periods, and (2) players' equilibrium forecasts are correct. With finite action spaces, (n(1),n(2)-)solutions always exist and are cyclical, and the memory capacity of the players has no influence on the set of solutions. A solution is hyperstable if it is ...
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作者：Padilla, AJ
摘要：The degree of collusiveness of a market with consumer switching costs is analyzed in an infinite-horizon model of duopolistic competition. In contrast with previous analyses, we assume that firms compete for the demand for a homogeneous good by setting prices simultaneously in each period. This problem is formulated as a simple stochastic game, and a symmetric stationary Markovian perfect equilibrium with distinctive economic features is studied. We show that switching costs unambiguously rela...
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作者：Hong, CS; Hui, MM
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：This paper extends Machina's (Econometrica 50 (1982), 277-323) characterization of risk aversion for Frechet differentiable non-expected utility preferences to the class of continuous non-expected utility preferences without imposing any differentiability requirement. The necessary and sufficient condition for risk aversion is derived in terms of the Schur concavity of the preference Functional when evaluated on finite lotteries with equal probabilities. The latter is characterized by its marg...
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作者：CHO, IK
摘要：We examine the implications of bounded rationality in repeated games by modeling the repeated game strategies as perceptrons (F. Rosenblatt, ''Principles of Neurodynamics,'' Spartan Books, and M. Minsky and S. A. Papert, ''Perceptions: An Introduction to Computational Geometry,'' MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988). In the prisoner's dilemma game, if the cooperation outcome is Pareto efficient, then we can establish the folk theorem by perceptrons with single associative units (Minsky and Papert),...
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作者：CHANG, R
摘要：Two governments bargain over the benefits of a monetary union in a cash-in-advance world. A novel feature of the model is that, because households trade every period, market behavior affects and is affected by the government negotiations. As a result, in addition to objective costs of delay, market expectations about the bargaining outcome emerge as crucial determinants of a monetary union. There is a continuum of bargaining outcomes indexed by market expectations. Some outcomes imply that the...
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作者：NEARY, HM; WINTER, RA
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：In the context of bilateral agency contracts in which the input of each agent cannot be contractually enforced, this paper asks, What determines the relative shares of the agents? The answer is simple and surprisingly general. The relative shares are given by the fourth root of the inverse ratio of the slopes of marginal products. This result is applied to several examples of bilateral agency contracts. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：ATKESON, A; LUCAS, RE
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：This paper describes the efficient allocation of consumption and work effort in an economy in which workers face idiosyncratic employment risk and considerations of moral hazard prevent full insurance. We impose a lower bound on the expected discounted utility that can be assigned to any agent from any date onward and show with this feature added, that the efficient unemployment insurance scheme induces an invariant cross-sectional distribution of individual entitlements to utility. The paper ...
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作者：SUEN, W
摘要：When the expected flow returns from an investment is positive, bancruptcy carries a cost in terms of the future profit opportunities forgone. This paper demonstrates that, under limited liability, the one-shot gain from taking risky projects is offset by the long-term loss resulting from a higher probability of bankruptcy. In a multi-period model, the incentive problems associated with limited liability is less severe than what static models would suggest. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
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作者：BHATTACHARYA, U; RENY, RJ; SPIEGEL, M
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：A general equilibrium framework is employed to illustrate how the advent of trading in new securities, about which an ''insider'' has private information, might cause a collapse of prevailing security markets. Roughly, securities that allow the insider to hedge his portfolio risk interfere with one other, and in some cases, so much so that these securities cannot simultaneously trade in any equilibrium. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
