Stability of strict equilibria in best experienced payoff dynamics: Simple formulas and applications

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Izquierdo, Segismundo S.; Izquierdo, Luis R.
• 署名单位: Universidad de Valladolid; Universidad de Burgos; Universidad de Valladolid
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105553
• 发表日期: 2022

摘要

We consider a family of population game dynamics known as Best Experienced Payoff Dynamics. Under these dynamics, when agents are given the opportunity to revise their strategy, they test some of their possible strategies a fixed number of times. Crucially, each strategy is tested against a new randomly drawn set of opponents. The revising agent then chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest in the test, breaking ties according to a given tie-breaking rule. Strict Nash equilibria are rest points of these dynamics, but need not be stable. We provide some simple formulas and algorithms to determine the stability or instability of strict Nash equilibria. (C) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.