Game forms, rights, and the efficiency of social outcomes
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Deb, R; Pattanaik, PK; Razzolini, L
署名单位：
University of California System; University of California Riverside; University of Mississippi
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.2201
发表日期：
1997
页码：
74-95
关键词：
摘要：
We consider Sen's familiar paradox of the Paretian liberal in a framework where individual rights are represented as a game form. We distinguish the different senses in which one can think of the problem of an inconsistency between the Pareto criterion and the existence of individual rights. Conditions, in terms of properties of the relevant game form, are given for such inconsistency to arise under different notions of game theoretic equilibria. (C) 1997 Academic Press.