Learning purified mixed equilibria
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Ellison, G; Fudenberg, D
署名单位：
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Harvard University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2581
发表日期：
2000
页码：
84-115
关键词：
摘要：
We examine the local stability of mixed equilibria in a smoothed fictitious play model. Our model is easy to analyze and yields the same conclusions as other models in 2 x 2 games. We focus on 3 x 3 games. Contrary to some previous suggestions, learning can sometimes provide a justification for complicated mixed equilibria. Whether an equilibrium is stable often depends on the distribution of payoff perturbations. The totally mixed equilibria of zero sum games are generically stable, and the totally mixed equilibria of symmetric games with symmetric perturbations are generically unstable. Classification Number: C72. (C) 2000 Academic Press.