Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Arya, A; Glover, J; Rajan, U
署名单位：
University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Carnegie Mellon University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2000.2648
发表日期：
2000
页码：
87-109
关键词：
摘要：
This paper studies implementation in a principal agent model of adverse selection. We explore ways in which the additional structure of principal agent models (compared to general implementation models) simplifies the implementation problem. We develop a connection between the single crossing property and monotonicity conditions which are necessary for Nash and Bayesian Nash implementation. We also construct simple implementing mechanisms that rely on the single crossing property and on assumptions about the outcome set frequently made in the principal-agent literature. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, D82. (C) 2000 Academic Press.