Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Berga, D; Serizawa, S
署名单位：
Universitat de Girona; Tohoku University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1999.2579
发表日期：
2000
页码：
39-61
关键词：
摘要：
In the context of the provision of one pure public good, we study how large a preference domain can be to allow for the existence of strategy-proof rules satisfying the no vetoer condition. This question is qualified by the additional requirement that a domain should include a minimally rich domain. We first characterize generalized median voter schemes as the unique class of strategy-proof rules on minimally rich domains. Then we establish that the unique maximal domain, including a minimally rich one which allows for the existence of strategy-proof rules satisfying the no vetoer condition, is the domain of convex preferences. Classification Number. D71. (C) 2000 Academic Press.