Markov perfect equilibrium I. Observable actions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Maskin, E; Tirole, J
• 署名单位: Institute for Advanced Study - USA
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2785
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 191-219
• 关键词: Dynamic games; simple strategies; Markov perfect equilibrium; payoff-relevant histories; Robustness

摘要

We define Markov strategy and Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) for games with observable actions. Informally, a Markov strategy depends only on payoff-relevant past events. More precisely, it is measurable with respect to the coarsest partition of histories for which, if all other players use measurable strategies, each player's decision-problem is also measurable. For many games, this definition is equivalent to a simple affine invariance condition. We also show that an MPE is generically robust: if payoffs of a generic game are perturbed, there exists an almost Markovian equilibrium in the perturbed game near the initial MPE. (C) 2001 Academic Press.