Aggregate pattern of time-dependent adjustment rules, II: Strategic complementarity and endogenous nonsynchronization

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lau, SHP
• 署名单位: Australian National University; Hong Kong Baptist University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2691
• 发表日期: 2001
• 页码: 199-231
• 关键词: interdependence; strategic complementarity; endogenous nonsynchronization

摘要

This paper provides an explanation for an important institutional feature of staggered time-dependent adjustment rules assumed in a number of macroeconomic models. It identifies strategic complementarity as the crucial factor leading to non-synchronized decisions in a game-theoretic framework. The paper first shows that nonsynchronization is the equilibrium outcome in an infinite-horizon game in which strategic complementarity is present. whether the players choose predetermined or fixed actions. By pursuing the interpretation of a nonsynchronized-move dynamic game as a series of games with symmetric Stackelberg leadership. it is further suggested that the relationship between strategic complementarity and the benefit to the Stackelberg follower provides the insight to the game-theoretic explanation of nonsynchronization. The results of this paper reveal a link between strategic complementarity and nonsynchronization-two important macroeconomic features. (C) 2001 Academic Press.