Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Echenique, F; Oviedo, J
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; Universidad Nacional de San Luis
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00184-4
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 358-376
• 关键词: Matching; core; lattice; STABILITY; algorithm; complexity; substitutability; Tarski's fixed point theorem

摘要

We characterize the core many-to-one matchings as fixed points of a map. Our characterization gives an algorithm for finding core allocations; the algorithm is efficient and simple to implement. Our characterization does not require substitutable preferences, so it is separate from the structure needed for the non-emptiness of the core. When preferences are substitutable, our characterization gives a simple proof of the lattice structure of core matchings, and it gives a method for computing the join and meet of two core matchings. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.