Local coordination and market equilibria

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chatterji, S; Ghosal, S
• 署名单位: University of Warwick; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00105-4
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 255-279
• 关键词: coordination; MARKETS; rationalizability; STABILITY

摘要

We reformulate the local stability analysis of market equilibria in a competitive market as a local coordination problem in a market game, where the map associating market prices to best-responses of all traders is common knowledge and well-defined both in and out of equilibrium. Initial expectations over market variables differ from their equilibrium values and are not common knowledge. This results in a coordination problem as traders use the structure of the market game to converge back to equilibrium. We analyse a simultaneous move and a sequential move version of the market game and explore the link with local rationalizability. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.