A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kalandrakis, A
• 署名单位: Yale University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00259-X
• 发表日期: 2004
• 页码: 294-322
• 关键词: Dynamic games; endogenous reversion point; Legislative bargaining; Markov perfect nash equilibrium; stage undominated voting strategies; uncovered set

摘要

We analyze an infinitely repeated divide-the-dollar bargaining game with an endogenous reversion point. In each period a new dollar is divided among three legislators according to the proposal of a randomly recognized member-if a majority prefer so-or according to previous period's allocation otherwise. Although current existence theorems for Markovian equilibria do not apply for this dynamic game, we fully characterize a Markov equilibrium. The equilibrium is such that irrespective of the discount factor or the initial division of the dollar, the proposer eventually extracts the whole dollar in all periods. We also show that proposal strategies are weakly continuous in the status quo that equilibrium expected utility is not quasi-concave, and the correspondence of voters' acceptance set (the set of allocations weakly preferred over the status quo) fails lower hemicontinuity. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.