Innovation timing games: a general framework with applications

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hoppe, HC; Lehmann-Grube, U
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; University of Hamburg
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.03.002
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 30-50
• 关键词: simple timing games; preemption; waiting; INNOVATION; R&D

摘要

We offer a new algorithm for analyzing innovation timing games. Its main advantage over the traditional approach is that it applies to problems that had previously been intractable. We use the algorithm to examine two classical innovation problems. We find that the competition takes the form of a waiting game with a second-mover advantage either for any level of R&D costs (process innovation) or for high R&D costs (product innovation). Moreover, both models predict that the second-mover advantage is monotonically increasing in the costs of RD. (C) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.