Voting by committees under constraints

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barberà, S; Massó, J; Neme, A
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.006
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 185-205
• 关键词: Voting; strategy-proofness; additive and separable preferences

摘要

We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.