Testing threats in repeated games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Spiegler, R
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.04.003
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 214-235
• 关键词: solution concepts; repeated games; threat testing; justifiability; RECIPROCITY; TRIGGER STRATEGIES

摘要

Under most game-theoretic solution concepts, equilibrium beliefs are justified by off-equilibrium events. I propose an equilibrium concept for infinitely repeated games, called Nash Equilibrium with Tests (NEWT), according to which players can only justify their equilibrium beliefs with events that take place on the equilibrium path itself. In NEWT, players test every threat that rationalizes a future non-myopic action that they take. The tests are an integral part of equilibrium behavior. Characterization of equilibrium outcomes departs from the classical folk theorems. The concept provides new insights into the impact of self-enforcement norms, such as reciprocity, on long-run cooperation. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.