Collective choice under dichotomous preferences

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bogomolnaia, A; Moulin, H; Stong, R
• 署名单位: Rice University; Rice University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.005
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 165-184
• 关键词: Collective choice; dichotomous preferences; randomization; time-sharing; strategyproofness; fair share

摘要

Agents partition deterministic outcomes into good or bad. A mechanism selects a lottery over outcomes (time-shares). The probability of a good outcome is the canonical utility. The utilitarian mechanism averages over outcomes with largest approval. It is efficient, strategyproof, anonymous and neutral. We reach an impossibility if, in addition, each agent's utility is at least 1/n, where n is the number of agents; or is at least the fraction of good to feasible outcomes. We conjecture that no ex ante efficient and strategyproof mechanism guarantees a strictly positive utility to all agents, and prove a weaker statement. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.