On the endogeneity of Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: games of accumulation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Romano, R; Yildrim, H
• 署名单位: Duke University; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.005
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 73-107
• 关键词: accumulation games; Cournot-Nash outcome; Stackelberg outcome

摘要

We characterize equilibria of games with two properties: (i) Agents have the opportunity to adjust their strategic variable after their initial choices and before payoffs occur; but (ii) they can only add to their initial amounts. The equilibrium set consists of just the Cournot-Nash outcome, one or both Stackelberg outcomes, or a continuum of points including the Cournot-Nash outcome and one or both Stackelberg outcomes. A simple theorem that uses agents' standard one-period reaction functions and the one-period Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria delineates the equilibrium set. Applications include contribution, oligopoly, and rent-seeking games. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.