Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fleurbaey, M; Suzumura, K; Tadenuma, K
• 署名单位: Hitotsubashi University; Hitotsubashi University; Universite de Pau et des Pays de l'Adour
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.05.009
• 发表日期: 2005
• 页码: 22-44
• 关键词: Social choice; Preference aggregation; INFORMATION; Independence of irrelevant alternatives; indifference surfaces

摘要

Arrow's celebrated theorem of social choice shows that the aggregation of individual preferences into a social ordering cannot make the ranking of any pair of alternatives depend only on individual preferences over that pair, unless the fundamental weak Pareto and non-dictatorship principles are violated. In the standard model of division of commodities, we investigate how much information about indifference surfaces is needed to construct social ordering functions satisfying the weak Pareto principle and anonymity. We show that local information such as marginal rates of substitution or the shapes within the Edgeworth box is not enough, and knowledge of substantially non-local information is necessary. (c) 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.