Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in N-player games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kojima, Fuhito
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.01.006
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 255-273
• 关键词: Equilibrium selection; PIM games; u-dominance; Risk-dominance; perfect foresight dynamics; linear stability; Network games; linear incentives; p-Dominance

摘要

In perfect foresight dynamics, an action is linearly stable if expectation that people will always choose the action is self-fulfilling. A symmetric game is a PIM game if an opponent's particular action maximizes the incentive of an action, independently of the rest of the players. This class includes supermodular games, games with linear incentives and so forth. We show that, in PIM games, linear stability is equivalent to u-dominance, a generalization of risk-dominance, and that there is no path escaping a u-dominant equilibrium. Existing results on N-player coordination games, games with linear incentives and two-player games are obtained as corollaries. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.