Learning dynamics for mechanism design: An experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Healy, Paul J.
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.03.002
• 发表日期: 2006
• 页码: 114-149
• 关键词: Mechanism design; experiments; Best response; public goods; DYNAMICS

摘要

In a repeated-interaction public goods economy, incomplete information and dynamic behavior may affect the realized outcomes of mechanisms known to be efficient in a complete information one-shot game. An experimental test of five public goods mechanisms indicates that subjects with private information appear to best respond to recent observations. This provides predictions about which mechanisms will generate convergence to their efficient equilibrium allocations. These predictions match the experimental result that globally stable efficient mechanisms realize the highest efficiency in practice. The simplicity of the suggested best response model makes it useful in predicting stability of mechanisms not yet tested. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.