The dark side of transparency: When hiding in plain sight works

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mayskaya, Tatiana; Nikandrova, Arina
• 署名单位: HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); City St Georges, University of London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105699
• 发表日期: 2023
• 关键词: transparency; Poisson process; strategic experimentation; Private learning; Privacy paradox

摘要

A hider publicly commits to the number of seekers and then privately gets involved in a story, which may be compromising. Each seeker aims to be the first to learn and report a compromising story. The seekers learn the story privately and in continuous time. With more seekers, the hider's story gets revealed at a faster rate, but each seeker gets discouraged and ceases learning more quickly. To reduce the probability of a compromising report, the hider may optimally choose infinitely many seekers. Nevertheless, the hider unambiguously benefits from making it harder for each seeker to learn her story.& COPY; 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons .org /licenses /by /4 .0/).