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作者：Szydlowski, Martin
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：I study information disclosure as a means to create conflict. A sender aims to keep two parties engaged in a war of attrition and reveals information about their relative strength. In the unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium, the sender employs shifting rhetoric: she alternates pipetting good and bad news about each party, so that neither appears too strong. Information designed to induce one party to continue fighting weakens the other party's incentives. This spillover effect may lead to early ...
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作者：Aleksenko, Stepan; Kohlhepp, Jacob
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We study how delegated recruitment shapes talent selection. Firms often pay recruiters via refund contracts, which specify a payment upon the hire of a suggested candidate and a refund if a candidate is hired but terminated during an initial period of employment. We develop a model of delegated recruitment and show that refund contracts with strong screening incentives lead to statistical discrimination in favor of candidates with more precise productivity information. This contrasts with a fi...
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作者：Cohen, Assa; Kargar, Mahyar; Lester, Benjamin; Weill, Pierre-Olivier
作者单位：Yeshiva University; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We develop a search-theoretic model of a dealer-intermediated over-the-counter market. Our key departure from the literature is to assume that, when a customer meets a dealer, the dealer can sell only assets that it already owns. Hence, in equilibrium, dealers choose to hold inventory. . We derive the equilibrium relationship between dealers' costs of holding assets on their balance sheets, their optimal inventory holdings, and various measures of liquidity, including bid-ask spreads, trade si...
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作者：Gerke, Stefanie; Gutin, Gregory; Hwang, Sung-Ha; Neary, Philip R.
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST); University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are partially shareable along social links. We introduce a model in which each individual in a social network not only decides how much of a shareable good to provide, but also decides which subset of neighbours to nominate as co- beneficiaries. An outcome of the model specifies an endogenously generated subnetwork and a public goods game occurring over the realised subnetwork. We prove the existence of specialised pure strategy Nash equili...
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作者：Dellis, Arnaud
作者单位：University of Quebec; University of Quebec Montreal
摘要：Whom should an interest group lobby in a legislature? I develop a model of informational lobbying, in which a legislature must decide on the allocation of district-specific goods and projects. An interest group chooses to search and provide information on districts' valuations of the goods. The setting is one of dis-tributive politics, where the proposed allocation of goods and projects is endogenous to the information provided by the interest group. I characterize the information search strat...
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作者：Fu, Ruonan; Melenberg, Bertrand; Schweizer, Nikolaus
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：In this paper, we study asymptotic expansions for distorted probabilities under ambiguity, revisiting the framework and analysis of Izhakian (2020b). We argue that the first order terms in these expansions need to be corrected and provide alternatives. We also revisit later results in this paper on the separation of ambiguity and ambiguity attitudes. We argue that a crucial lemma is flawed implying that Izhakian's ambiguity measure (sic)(2) is not an equivalent way of representing the preferen...
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作者：Basak, Deepal
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business
摘要：We consider the canonical frequent-offer Rubinstein bargaining game between two leaders on a policy issue. The public sentiment on this issue leans toward one leader or the other. Public sentiment determines the maximum compromise a leader can make without risking getting primaried. We introduce a positive probability.. that the leaders are uninformed about the sentiment. We show that a unique equilibrium emerges that resembles a war of attrition, in which one of the leaders may demand too muc...
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作者：Shende, Priyanka; Purohit, Manish
作者单位：Amazon.com; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：We consider the problem of allocating indivisible objects to agents when agents have strict preferences over objects. There are inherent trade-offs between competing notions of efficiency, fairness and incentives in such assignment mechanisms. It is, therefore, natural to consider mechanisms that satisfy two of these three properties in their strongest notions, while trying to improve on the third dimension. In this paper, we are motivated by the following question: Is there a strategy-proof a...
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作者：Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Panebianco, Fabrizio; Pin, Paolo
作者单位：Bocconi University; Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; University of Siena; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Catholic University of the Sacred Heart
摘要：Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their optimal action depends on an unknown state that is, actually, an aggregate of the actions of their neighbors. In each period, every agent chooses an action that maximizes her instantaneous subjective expected payoff and then updates her beliefs according to what she observes. In...
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作者：Borie, Dino
作者单位：CY Cergy Paris Universite
摘要：We axiomatize the maxmin expected utility model in Savage's original framework, which does not re-quire a rich set of consequences nor objective probabilities. The key conditions in our result reformulate Gilboa-Schmeidler's (1989) Uncertainty Aversion and Certainty Independence for Savage's acts. Also, we propose a definition for comparative ambiguity aversion in this context. (c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
