Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ehlers, Lars; Masso, Jordi
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.007
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 587-600
• 关键词: Matching market; incomplete information; singleton core

摘要

We study ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truth-telling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores. Our result matches the observations of Roth and Peranson [The redesign of the matching market for American physicians: some engineering aspects of economic design, Amer. Econ. Rev. 89 (1999) 748-780] in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) in the United States: (i) the cores of the profiles submitted to the clearinghouse are small and (ii) while truth-telling is not a dominant strategy most participants in the NRMP truthfully reveal their preferences. (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.