Sequentially consistent rules of choice under complete uncertainty

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Arlegi, Ricardo
• 署名单位: Universidad Publica de Navarra
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.01.004
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 131-143
• 关键词: choice under complete uncertainty; nonprobabilistic decision rules; sequentially consistent rules

摘要

This work analyzes the problem of individual choice under complete uncertainty. In this context, each alternative action consists of a set of different possible outcomes with no associated probability distribution. The work examines and defines a class of rules such that: (a) the evaluation of sets (actions) follows a certain procedural pattern; and (b) an assumption of sequential contraction consistency, which is an adaptation of Sen's alpha condition, is satisfied. In this framework, some results of characterization show that several well-known rules for comparing sets of outcomes can be reinterpreted in procedural terms. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All fights reserved.